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Kristjánsson (henceforth K.) is a moral philosopher with a long-standing interest in Aristotle, and 
whose recent books on pride and jealousy (2002), and justice-based emotions (2006), have a 
strong Aristotelian flavour.  This book, according to the Introduction (chapter 1), aims to 
contribute to the field of ‘values education’, especially the ‘character education’ and ‘social and 
emotional learning’ trends, strong particularly in the USA.  K. argues that, while many in the field 
pay lip service to Aristotelian inspiration, there is much muddled thinking about Aristotle’s actual 
views on child rearing, moral education, and the place of emotions in the educational programme.  
K. takes at face value moral educators’ desire for genuine Aristotelian grounding, and aims to 
show what Aristotle can (and cannot) contribute, in general strongly recommending him as a 
guide. 
The following ten chapters examine specific issues: (2) the moral education of children; 
(3) whether one can develop phronêsis merely through habituation; (4) whether any emotions 
should be eradicated; (5) whether, and how, one should teach children to feel justified anger; 
(6) to what extent proponents of Emotional Intelligence can cite Aristotle in support; (7) whether 
emulation (of role models, or desirable character traits) is pedagogically a useful emotion; 
(8) whether parents and children can be true character friends; (9) whether generosity/charity is 
an Aristotelian virtue; (10) the extent to which agreeableness, manners and morality overlap; and 
(11) whether teaching is a praxis. 
K. starts each chapter with an ‘Assumption’ that purports to be an amalgam of typical muddled 
thinking.  For instance (chapter 2): “‘Aristotle does not really provide a coherent conception of 
childhood.  He offers no systematic theory of moral development, and his idea of moral virtue is 
based solely on self-control: teaching children to flex their will-power muscles.’” (p15).  To 
someone (like the present reader) not familiar with the above-mentioned pedagogical movements, 
it is hard to know to what extent these ‘Assumptions’ are straw men.  However, even if they are 
an authorial conceit, they do usefully indicate the ground each chapter aims to cover.  K. typically 
proceeds by drawing out relevant themes from (mostly) the Ethics and the Rhetoric, before 
moving on to give modern scholars’ views, and arguing against these and for his own conception, 
finally concluding each chapter “Assumption X is wrong.”  Some chapters contain considerably 
more Aristotle than others: 2-5 and 7-8 will be of most interest to classicists. 
Several chapters, however, almost seem to abandon Aristotle for extended critiques of modern 
scholars (e.g. Goleman p83-97, Kupfer p116-22).  K.’s method of critique is frequently to group 
scholars into schools, label them, and then dismiss their arguments by means of the label.  For 
instance, having stated (p157) that there are “three neo-Aristotelian sub-perspectives” in 
“educational circles” – the ethos perspective, the logos perspective (both dismissed in a 
paragraph), and the phronesis-praxis perspective (PPP) – he concludes: “The advocates of the 
PPP try to establish an anti-realist, non-foundationalist, perspectivist account of education and 
educational theory with reference to a philosopher whose epistemology and methodology are 
unabashedly realist, foundationalist (naturalist) and cosmopolitan.” (p162). 
In the Introduction K. states: “I do not pretend to be a classics expert, let alone an Aristotelian 
scholar, and my goals are not exegetical: I have unearthed no new readings of Greek texts or hit 
upon novel interpretations that are destined to shake the classics world.  I rely on existing 
translations…” (p5).  K. here neatly encapsulates (presumably to neutralise) several obvious 
criticisms of the book, reflecting aspects that do limit its usefulness to classics scholars.  
Classicists are also hampered by the index, which is mostly a list of modern scholars’ names.  
‘Education’ is not listed; ‘emotions’ is wrongly inset, so easy to miss; and ‘Aristotle’ is followed 
by “1-280”, which is neither helpful nor accurate.  The book will be of most use (in the classics 
world) to undergraduates, or scholars approaching the subject for the first time, wanting an 
overview of relevant issues. 
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